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ABSTRACT
This paper assesses the theoretical and empirical basis for American
labor union leaders' contention that imports have been a big source of
job loss in the United States. It is shown, first, that identification of
job losses "due to imports" is exceptionally difficult because economic growth
affects adversely the industries believed affected by imports. Then, an
accounting framework is employed to assess possible empirical orders of mag-
nitude. The results are fairly conclusive in indicating that factors other
than import competition have been primary in leading to structural shifts
in employment.
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PROTECTIONIST PRESSURES, IMPORTS, JND EMPLOYMENT
IN ThE UNITED STATES
Anne 0. Krueger*
The American labor movement reversed its support of free trade in
the 1960s, claiming and believing that "American jobs are lost" as a
consequenceof import competition. Its switch to a protectionist stance
hasbeena significant force in American political discussions regarding
trade policy. There canbelittle doubt that American adoption of such
protectionist measures as trigger pricing for steel and the mu].t:ifiber
agreement was, in substantial measure, a consequence of labor pressures
and the view of many other Americans that American labor was essentially
correct in its beliefs. Advocates of free trade felt compelled to
support "adjustment" assistance to "importimpacted workers" as part of
their case.
It is the purpose of this paper to reviewthetheory and empirical -
evidenceunderlying the view that job losses have,, in some sense, re—
suited from import competition. The basic message is that, at least
for the United States, it is exceptionally difficult to make an argument
that job losses, however defined, have been "caused", in any substantial
part, by import competition. A first section briefly sets forth con-
ventional theory as to the possible relationship between imports and
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opinions expressed are those of the author and not those of the National
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employment. A second section sets forth some empirical evidence about
the changing composition of employment in U.S. manufacturing industry
and the proximate decomposition of those changes into those generated
by demand patterns, by productivity growth, and by imports or the net
trade balance. A final section provides some indication as to the re-
lative importance, within several allegedly trade—impacted industries,
of gross and net employment changes in determining layoffs, and examines
briefly the question of who gains, and who loses, in industries receiving
protection.
I, HOW CAN IMPORTS AFFECT ELOYMENT?
Different economic theories have varying models of the underlying
determinants of employment and wage determination. None of t:hem assigns
toimports (contrasted with the trade balance) a cent:ral role in the
determination of employment,
At one extreme lies neoclassical theory, in which wages are fully
flexible, so that the number of persons employed is a function of demand
for,and supply of, labor.Any shift in the demandcurvefor labor is
associated with a change in employment only insofar as the labor supply
curve is not perfectly inelastic. When thedemandcurve for labor shifts
upward,employmentincreasesor decreases as the labor supply curve is
forward sloping or backward bending. In the neoclassical model, import
competitioncould affect employment and/or the real wage viathe Stolper—
Samuelsoneffect, with free trade resulting in a downward or upward shift
indemand for labor, depending upon the relative factor intensity of
imports andexports. If, asLeontief, Baldwin, Branson andNonoyios—3—
and others have found American exports are relatively labor—intensive
contrasted with American imports, theory would suggest that free trade
would result in a higher real wage than would protection, and employment
would be greater or less with free trade depending upon the sign of the
slope of the labor supply curve.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the simple IS—LN Keynesian
model,in which the real wage isexogenously determined (via the price
level or other means),aithelevel of aggregate demand determines the
levelof employment. In the model, fiscal and monetary policy determine
the level of employment, and changes in imports are significant only
insofar as they are not accompanied by changes in exports.
What all these models have in common is that they treat the level of
employment as a macroeconomic phenomenon which, in the aggregate, it
surely is. In addition, one cannot associate increases in imports with
job losses unless one extends the analysis to take into account both
the general equilibrium repercussions of the net increase in exports that
wouldaccompany any change in imports and also the underlying nature of
the labor market (and in particular whether changes inthedemand for
laborare likely to be reflected in changes in the nominal or real wage
rate). It is thus apparent that one cannot legitimately view imports,
or changes in import levels, as a significant determinant of aggregate
employment.
What may make sense, however, is to examine "impact effects" on dif-
ferent industries of the changing pattern of trade. For, while aggregate
employment levels are surely a function more of macroeconomic variables
than of trade flows, it can be contended that import competition causes
some individuals and firms to relocate either geographically or sectorally—4-.
and that such relocation may cause hardships. If one is to make economic
sense out of demands for protection on grounds of the "employment" effect
of imports, it must surely be these "impact" effects, and the short—term
dislocations that individual industries may suffers that are the source
1
of concern.
Even here, however, there are significant, and important, difficulties.
For, as is well known, there are many causes of changes in employment
composition Changes in tastes and other random factors can result: in
an altered distribution of output and employment. Competitive successes
and failures lead tochanging patterns within, as well as between, industries..
Perhaps even more important, the process of economic growt:h generates
systematic changes in patterns of employment and output:.. This is both
because: 1) income elasticities differ from unity, and employment must
therefore shIft from low—income—elasticity goods to high income—elasticity
goods if the. process of economic growth is to continue, and 2) factor
accumulation, and especially accumulation
of physical and human capital, alters the relative scarcity of different
factors of production. As that happens, the real wage accruing to unskilled
labor risea,whire the real return to capital and skills falls relative
to the return to unskilled labor. The change in relative factor prices)
in turn, alters the relative costs of production in. different lines, thus
altering relative prices of final goods (unless, by chance, technological
changes proceeds faster in relatively unskilled labor—intensive industries),
and inducing consumers to substitute capital—and skill—intensive goods
'Even if this argument proved to be valid and empirically significant,
It would not constitute a convincing case for protection: The permanent
consumption losses associated with failing to adjust would have to be eva-
luated against the short—term "gains" that stemmd from avoiding dilocation
costs. On the size of those costs in the U.S., see Bale.—5—
forunskilled—labor intensive goods in their consumption basket.'
That change must occur in the process of economic growth is widely
accepted. Indeed, it would not be possible for rapid—growth industries
to expand unless resources were released from contracting industries,
andresistancesto those changes would, by definition, retard the growth
process. For present purposes, however, a major difficulty arises: for
advanced countries such as the United States, the same labor—intensive
industries that are likely to contract relatively because of rising real
wages are the ones where import competition is most likely to be felt..
This follows naturally from the factor proportions explanation of trade':
just as industries intensive in the use of unskilled labOr are likely
to be slowly growing because of their cost disadvantage with rising real
wages, those same industries are likely to be at a competitive disadvantage
vis—a—vis competition from imports, since the comparative advantage of
theU.S. (and otheradvancedcountries) islikely tolie in capit:al and
skill—intensive goods.
Thus,the fact that the number of jobs in a certain labor—intensive
industrymaybe declining is not per se evidencethat imports are the
"cause'. To the extent that the foreign supply curve remains constant
through the process, there is some presumption that the declinein employ--
mentis primarily a consequence of rising real wage rates andtheprocess
of reallocation of labor towards higher value—adding industries. In fact,
or an elaboration of this argument, and a simulation of the dii feren—
tial employment impact of capital deepening on labor—and capital—intensive
industries,seeKrueger (1979b). -
2Note,however, that it is not consistent with the Leontief finding
that U.S. exports are capital—intensive relative to U.S. imports.—6—
if the foreign supply curve of imports is constant over time, it would
bedifficult to attribute employment declines to "import competition":
at most, a case could be made thatthe presence of importcompetition
preventedthe domestic price from increasing as rapidly as it otherwise
wouldhave. In that sense, imports permit higher domestic consumption
levels of labor—intensive goods than would otherwise be possible. Only
a part of imports can be regarded as replacing domestic output: in con—
sumption.
The preceed.ing paragraph points up a major conceptual difficulty
in attempting to estimate the "employment losses" attributable to imports:
quite aside from general equilibrium problems, appropriate estimation
would entail the specification of domestic demand and supply functions,
andinaddition would require estimation of the extent to which imports
in a particular category increased moving along a foreign supply curve
and the extent to which they rose because of shifts in foreign supply
1
curves.
Itis these considerations which motivate the method of measurement
used in the next section. Because of the deep—seated difficulties in
identifying the extent to which it is factors associated with economic
growth or it is imports that affect employment opportunities in labor—
Intensive industries, an accounting framework is instead employed.
'There is another difficulty with the "imports cause job losses"
argument: insofar as the domestic supply of import—competing goods is
inelastic, increased imports would be met by a lower domestic price, with
employment fairly constant. It is only if the supply curve of domestic
labor—intensive goods is fairly elastic that one can argue sensitivity
to foreign competition. But an elastic domestic supply presumably
implies alternative uses of the factors of production.—7—
II, ACCOUNTING FOR THESECTORALCOMPOSITION OF AMERICAN
MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT CHANGES, 1970 to1976
The period 1970 to 1976 was chosen for analysis for several reasons.
On one hand,Frank has already analyzed the import—employment relation
for the period 1963 to 1971, finding that the AFL—CIO claims for the
impact of import levels on employment were greatly exaggerated and that:,
even for the three—digit industries for which imports were either largest
or hadgrownmost rapidly, rates of growth of demand and of labor product-
ivity were significantly larger than import growth in affecting rates
of change of employment. For present purposes, the year 1970, rather 1971,
was chosen as an initial year for several reasons: 1) the existence of
Frank's work covering the 1960s; 2) 1970 marked the year before dollar
devaluation and is often pinpointed as the time when the large increase
in imports started; and 3) because dollar devaluation took place inthe
middle of 1971, price statistics for 1971 to 1976 are somewhat: less reliable
than those for 1970 to 1976.
The choice of 1976 for a terminal year was affected by several factors:
1) it was the latest year for which data were available as of the time
thecomputations were undertaken; 2) itwas still a year of ie.ss—t:han.
full—employment in the United States, so that concern with jobs and em-
ployment opportunities was perhaps better focused than was the case in
theyears 1977 and1978 whenthe overall unemployment rate waslower;
and3) the price adjustments of 1974 and 1975 had had a chance to work
their way through the system, so that data for 1976 may better reflect
underlying long—term factors than data for earlier years. It should be
noted also that the l970s were the period during which concern about import—8--
competition from the LDCs has been intense: focus upon the 1970—76 period
should therefore enable a judgment asto its validity.1
Form the identity
C Q. —x+M. (1) it it it it
where C is domestic utilization (for final private consumption ,inter—
industry demand, inventory accumulation, other investment, and government
use) of the ith good in period t, Q is domestic output, X is exports, and
H is imports. All variables are measured in constant base—period prices.
At any time t, labor has an average productivity:
Q.
(2)
whereLit is employment in the ith industry or sector and a. ii;the
average product of labor.
Define S as the ratio of domestic output to domestic consumption
(S Q/C) and assume that the domestic share of output in consumption,
S, labor productivity, a, and domestic utilization all grow (or decline)




11t should be noted, however, that the LDC share of imports into
the OECD countries remained relatively small in 1976 and subsequent years.
Manufactured exports from developing to industrialized countries in 1976
constituted 9.9 percent of total manufactured imports by industrialized
countries, and only 1.6 percent of consumption of manufactured products
in developed countries. See World Bank, World Development Report 1979,
P. 21.—9—
S,S,a, a, Cand C can all be ascertained from initial—year and
terminal values, thus yielding solutions for the three rates of growth.
Employment, L, can then be expressed as:
La1 S Ca'e pt seatC e8
ttt t 0 0 0
=Ee(+ct—p)t
The rate of growth of employment is thus expressed as the sum of t:hree
components: the growth rate of domestic consumption,1 the growt:h rate
of the share of domestic output in domestic consumption, and (minus)
the growth rate of labor productivity.2 A negative sii for a, for
example, indicates that the share of domestic consumption met by
domestic production declined, and a can be interepreted as the additional
continuousrate of growth inemployment that would have been attained
hadtheshare of .domestic output in domestic consumption remained
constant,ALLELSE UNRANGED. Forreasons spelled out above, it is not
atall evident that all else would have remained unchanged, so that the
interpretation of a must be purely definitionaL In a closed economy,
a would be zero by definition. However, the growth rates t3 and p would
very likely be different, even given the same underlying tastes,
'Domestic consumption is defined alternatively as domestic 1)rOduct.iofl
plus imports (which implicitly includes exports as part of domestic
demand) and domestic production plus imports less exports. Comparison of
the two sets of results permits a contrast between the gross sectoral
effect and the net effect.
2Alternatively,onecould compute time trends from regression equations
anduse them to calculaterates in Equation (6). The difficulties of
gatheringthe data precluded suchan effort.-10—
production functions and factor endowments as in the open economy
1
case.
Using these relations, data were collected for 1970 and 1976.
Despite the apparent simplicity of the accounting framework, there is
nothing simple about data collection: trade statistics are on a commodity
basis, output and employment statistics are on an industry basis, and
price statistics are compiled on yet a third basis. Considerable
effort is involved in reconciling these three groups of data.
Table 1 gives the continuous rates of growth of consumption (utili-
zation), labor productivity, imports,the net trade balance, and eniployrnent
derived by the procedures described above. By definition, the sum of
thefirst three columns equals the last column. For non—electrical
machinery,for example, the rate of growth of domestic utilization
(defined as domestic consumption plus imports) was2.81percentcontinuously,
while labor productivity grew .54percent and the shareof domestic output
in domestic utilization fell at a continuous rate of .32percentsEmploy-
ment grew at an annual average rate of 1.95 percent (equal to 2.81 minus
.54minus.32), To state itanother way: had importsgrownat thesame
rateas domestic production while domestic utilization and labor productivity
followedtheir actual growth paths,employment would have increased at a
continuousrate .32 percent faster than therealized one. If net t:rade
11t should be noted thatcannot be interpreted simply as the rate of
upwardshift in thedemand curve: whatever price changes occurred during
theperiod under analysis would affect the estimated rate of growth of
utilization, and 3 links observed utilization levels. Only if price had
remained unchanged would f reflect the rate of upward shift of the demand
curve. Even then, the rate of growth of real income might well differ in
a closed economy, so thatwould differ on that reason.
2The interested reader is referred to Krueger (l979a) for particulars with
regard to the data sources. Obtaining reliable price deflators is perhaps
the most difficult task, but any errors in those estimates are reflected
in both labor productivity and demand, and thus do not affect the estimate
of .Printingand publishing was omitted for lack of an appropriate
price index.—i 1—
Table 1
U.S. Rates of Growth of Demands Labor Productivity,





CodeName Growthtivity Imports(=X—N) Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
20 Food Products 1.30 —1,68 -—.02 -—13 -.41
21 Tobacco Products L32 —1.78 —.05 —.38 --.51
22 Textile NillProducts—.20 .47 .09 .43 —.58
23 Apparel 3.03 —-2.68 —-.96 —-.77 --.62
24 Lumber Products —L16 4.20 —.18 —.19 2.85
25 Furniture & rixtures 1.41 —1.56 —.24 .09 —.39
26 Paper & Paper Prod— 2.16 —-2.48 —.13 —.01 —.45
ucts
28 Chemicals 1.80 —1.56 ---.20 —.08 .04
29 Petroleum & Coal 2,68 —1.78 -—.43 .59 .47
Products .
30 Rubber & Plastic 3.87 —1.20 —.30 —-.06 2.37
Products
-
31 Leather Products —.60 .38 —1.51 —1.27 -—1.73
32 Stone, Clay & Glass .18 .38 --.11 —.05 .45
Products
33 Primary Metals .01 —.79 —.23 -.42 —.92
34 Fabricated Metal 2.32 .17 —.16 —.18 2.33
Products :
35 Non—Electric Mach—2.81 —.54 —-.32 --.55 1.95
inery
36 Electrical & Elec—2.20—2.12 —.90 -—.14 —.82
tronic Equipment
37 Transportation Equip—2.04 —.92 —.64 —.23 .48
ment
38 Instruments 7.75—2.12 —56 —.28 5.08
39 Miscellaneous 2.66—2.12 —.58 .01 —.04
Manufacturing
Source: Department of Conmerce Bureau of the U.S. Census, U. S. Commodity
Exportsand Imports as Related to Output 1970 and 1969 and 1976 and 1975.
Annual Survey ofManufactures, 1970 and 1976. Output and trade data for 1976
weredeflated by the Department of Commerce 2—digit SIC deflators contained
in Wholesale Prices andPrice Indices Data for January 1977, Data for January
1971,and December 1976 figureswere used.—12—
balance, rather than imports, is used, employment and labor product:ivity
growth rates are unaffected. Thus, "true" domestic utilization can
be derived by adding the difference between the trade balance rate and
the import rate to the domestic demand growth rates. For example, for
electrical and electronic equipment the import share decreased at a
rate of -.90percent while the share of the net trade balance declined
at a rate of —l4 percent. Thus, part of the increase in imports was
offset by growth of exports, and the growth of domestic utilization,
defined as Q+M X, was 1.44 percent annually (2.20 —.90.14).
Examinationof the data in Table 1 suggests that rates of change in
domestic demand and labor productivity were quantitatively larger than
the rate of growth of import share in all two digit sectors except for
leather, even without taking into account the behavior of exports in t:he
same sectors. Moreover, in only three sectors —electricaland electronic
equipment, apparel, and miscellaneous manufactures ——inwhich employment
declined could employment have grownwitha constant import share even
if demand and labor productivity had followed their actual course.
These conclusions emerge even more strongly if the net t:rade balance
colii, rather than the 'import columa, is examined. For miscellaneous
manufacturing,the increase in exports was sufficient to change the sign
of the trade effect.
It thus seems difficult to attach much credence, at the two—digit
level, to the arguments that importshave significantly impacted employ-
ment. There are twoobjections thathave been raised to that conclusion..
On one hand, proponents of protection have asserted that increases in
labor productivity may be associated with import competition; on the
other hand, it can be argued that more disaggregated data would tell a
differentstory.—1 3—
The first argument ——thatincreasing imports result in increased
rates of labor productivity growth ——isdifficult to evaluate. If it
is true, it would significantly increase the welfare losses associated
with any protectionist measures. it is not, therefore, necessarily an
argument in favor of protection. At the two—digit level, however, there
does not appear to be anysimplerelationship between productivity growth
rates and imports: a regression of the rate of growth of labor product—
ivityonthe rate of growth of imports (from the data in Table 1) yields
anegative(—.03) but statistically insignificant coefficient. It seems
equally plausible that increased imports might spur domestic entrepreneurs
to a greater efficiency, and that industries with slow rates of product-
ivity growth (and therefore above—average rates of increases in price)
would be the ones most likely affected by import competition.. There is
no compelling reason why causation should be the same in all findustries.
While further research might yield fruitful results in clarifying the
relationship between import competition and domestic efficiency, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the productivity—import competitioa argument
can go either way andiscertainly not well enough documented to serve
as a basis for either a free trade or a protectionist case given the
present state of knowledge.
The second argument ——thattwo—digit industries are not sufficiently
disaggregated ——hasmore appeal. It should be noted, however, that the
more disaggregated the industry, the higher in absolute value the price
elasticity of demand facing it is likely to be. To that extent, even
where import competition appears to be a significant factor, there is
a question about the extent to which protection would result in increased
domestic production levels, rather than reduced domestic consumption levels.—14—
Nonetheless, in an attempt to evaluate the contention, the available
data were collected on four—digit subsectors of the two—digit industries:
textiles, apparel, leather products, andelectricalandelectronicequip-
ment. These are the four sectors which are most widely regarded as having
experienced significant dislocation due to import competition. Unfortunately,
the necessity to obtain price deflators becomes increasingly .difficiilt as
the definition of an industry narrows, and the number of subsectors for
which it was possible to estimate output, trade and employment levels
was not large. Table 2 presents the results.
-
Ascan be seen, the variation in employment growth rates across four—
digit industries is, as would be expected, considerably larger than for
two—digit sectors. Nonetheless, the general impression remains much the
same: demand and labor productivity growth rates, and not imports, have
been the dominant factor in affecting rates of employment growth. Of
the 42 four—digit industries for which data were available, there were
12 which experienced rates of employment decline in excess of 3 percent.
In only one of those was the rate of increase of the import share in ex-
cess of 1.33, and that was radio and TV sets, where employment decreased
3.72 percent at a continuous annual rate, while the import share rose at
a rate of 3.20 percent. Par the four—digit industry with the most rapid
rate of employment decline (electronic receiving tubes), the industry
experienced declining demand at a rate of 12.1 percent, increased labor
productivity at 7.45 percent, and an increased import share at 1.32 percent.
Although the data are not conclusive because of the absence of appro-
priate data for other subsectors, the evidence seems fairly strong that
even at the four—digit level, it cannot be so that protection, or reduction
of imports, could in any major part have offset the tendency toward reduced
employment levels at the four—digit level. Production growth and demand





Code Name - Growth ProductivityImportsEmplonent
2211 Cotton Weaving Hills 6.48 —10.18 — .56 — 4.26
2221 Synthetic Weaving Hills 1.90 — .25 .10 1.74
2231 Wool Weaving Mills —10.18 — 2.10 .22 —12.07
2252 Hosiery Mills,n.e.c. 2.74 — 5.87 .57 2.57
2272 Tufted Carpets & Rugs 6.29 — 5.90 .02 .40
2281 Yarn Mills 3.86 1..74 .03 2.15
2283 Wool Mills —16.73 1.32 - .51 —15.93
2297 Combing Plants 21.54 —12.28 7.59 16.86
2298 Cordage & Twine 5.35 .06— —1.20 4.19
2311 Hens' & Boys' Suits & Coats — .85 —.1.73 —1.21 3.79
2321 Hens' & Boys' Shirts 5.06 2.55 -2.38 .15
2327 Hens' & Boys' Pants .35 — 2.76 .65 — 1.76
2328 Hens' & Boys' Work Clothing 6.32 1./i7 --1.45 3.41
2341 Womans' & Childrens' Underwear .23 — 3.05 .03 — 2.84
2342 Corsets & Allied Garments — .30 — 7.20 1.33 8.84
2369 Childrens' Outerwear 8.30 5.08 --4.31 1.15
2386 Leather & Sheepskin Clothing 9.03 1.49 —6.81 3.72
2392 House Furnishings .69 — 2.01 — .12 - 1.45
3131 Yootwear Cut Stock —10.28 2.99 — .81 — 8b9
3161 Luggage 7.94 — 5.32 1.65 .95
3171 Womens' Handbags 7.76 — 4.39 -i.$9 3.52
3172 Personal Leather Goods n.e.c. 2.26 — 4.95 —1.03 — 372—
3612 Transformers — 1.38 — 2.24 — .19 — 3.80
3621 Motors & Generators — 1.01 — .34 — .86 — 7.23
3623 Welding Apparatus 2.65 — .23 — .19 2.23
3624 Carbon Products — 1.08 .73 .35 .00
3632 Household Refrigerators — 2.80 — 3.03 — .26 — 6.09
3633 Household Laundry Equipment .80 4.13 — .02 — 3.34
3634 Housewares & Pans
•
5.82 5.83 .02 .01
3635 Vacuum Cleaners 6.82 — 5.26 07 1.59
3636 Sewing Machines 1.51 1.98 1.31 4.79
3639 Household Appliances n.e.c. 7.51 — 5.72 —2.86 — 1.07
3641 Lamps — .20 — 2.32 — 21 — 2.73
3643 Current Carrying Wiring Devices 1.51 — .30 —1.22 .00
3644 Non—current Carrying Wiring
Devices — 2.11 .15 .02 — 1.96
3651 Radio & TV Sets 9.18 — 9.70 —3.20 — 3.72
3652 Phonographs 10.51 —11.21 — .19 — .90
3671 Electronic Receiving Tubes —12.12 — 7.45 —1.32 —20.88
3684 Semi—conductors 19.85 —15.60 —1.82 2.43
3691 Storage Batteries 5.83 — 4.29 — .02 1.51
3692 Primary Batteries .4.29 — 2.26 — .28 1.76
3693 X—ray Apparatus 15.26 — 1.10 — .66 13.52—16—
III. WHOGAINSANDWHO LOSESFROM PROTECTION?
In light of the evidence that protection could not in any major way
reverse the employment trends in most declining industries) it is of in-
terest to ask where protectionist pressures originate, and who gains from
protection. There is, first, the question of the division of whatever
spoils there are between labor and capital. As Mageehasneatly documented,
owners and workers have generally lobbied on the same side of Irotectionist
legislation. If labor is relatively mobile contrasted with capital, in-
ternational trade models would suggest that the gains to capital from
protection would exceed the gains tolabor.1
There is another, somewhat re.lated,.aspect, which may be partly unique
to the United States. That is, a number of industries have relocated
geographically within the United States. Consider, for example, the data
in Table 3. They indicate the number of persons employed in the t:extile
industry (SIC 22) andthe apparelindustry (SIC 23) in two major regions
of the United States, along with total U.S. employment.2 As can be seen,
the fortunes of the two have been quite different, as employment in New
England and the Middle Atlantic States has dropped sharply since 1959,
while employment in the. South Atlantic states and the East South Central
region has grown continuously in the apparel industry, and been rising
or fairly steady in the textile industry. If one takes the states in the
1See,forexample, Mayer. There also questions about the interindustry
impacts of protection. For example, insofar as the multifiber agreement has
raised the European and American price of textiles above that East Asia, one
would anticipate that East Asia would gain a competitive advantage in the ex-
port of apparel. Similar questions must surely be raised about protectionof steel
2The New England and Middle Atlantic States include: Maine, New Hampshire,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey and
Pennsylvania. South Atlantic and East South Central include: Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky,Tennessee,
Alabama and Mississippi.Table 3
Employment in the U.S. Textile and Apparel






Sources:U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Annual











1959 300.2 (32.3) 571.7 (61.6)
1965 249.6 (28.0) 595.2 (66.8)
1970 218.5 (23.6) 652.2 (70.5)
1976 175.6(20.1) 645.1 (73.7)
Apparel
1959 695.6 (56.2) 271.2 (21.9) 1238.7
1965 657.3 (50,1) 366.8 (28.0) 1,311.8
1970 574.9 (42.9) 429.2 (32.0) 1,341.4
1976 432.3 (34.0) 472.8(37.2) 1,270.6—18—
U.S. and partitions theni into those in which employment rose and those in
which employment fell between 1970 and 1976 in textiles, and sums the
gross employment change within each group of states, the resulting number
is that there were 29.1 thousand additional jobs in the states with gains,
and 77.8 thousand less jobs in the states which experienced losses. In
apparel, there were 103.2 new jobs in states with gains, and 173.2 losses
in states where employment fell.
All of these figures indicate an additional dimension to the problem
of declining industries in the United States industries are relocating
in areas where labor costs are lower at the same time as they are contract-
ing nationally. As Table 3 vividly indicates, the lost employment in
New England and the Middle Atlantic States was more than offset, at least
until 1970, by gains in employment in the South Atlantic and East South
Central States.
These data point up an additional consideration of some importance
if the. dislocation costs of job losses are the motive behind protection:
the pace of relocation may increase or decrease with additional protection
from Imports. In one study on the subject, Isard argued that protection
in the textile industry raised profits, which in turn raised the rate
at which automated machinery replaced labor in that industry. To the
extent that increased profits are also an inducement for expansion, and
expansion occurs in parts of the country other than where existing plants
are located, the presumption that protection can do anything to reduce
the rate of dislocation in the states losing employment is still further
weakened.
Little is known about the ways in which firms and industry structure
actually respond to shifts in demand, whether generated by protection from
imports or other phenomena. Taking a neutral assumption, that the rate of19—
shift of the share of employment between north and south is independent
of the height of protection (and presumably therefore the profitability
of the industry, although this latter is questionable unless it is
assund that the wage is competitively determined and that the supply of
labor to the textile industry is perfectly elastic), the data in Table 3
suggest that, even had protection in the textile industry been sufficient
to maintain employment in 1976 at its 1970 level, job losses in the north
would only have been reduced from 42.9 million to 32.7 million, while
employment in the south would have increased by 29.1 million. The
figures for apparel are even more striking, as the south in fact increased
textile employment in the face of a declining national total.. If, as
seems to be the case, it is the dislocation of job losses that is the
principal concern of those advocating protection, regional consideiatar
in the United States would suggest that, at least in textiles and apparel,
a large number of additional jobs would have to be created (in the South)
per job loss prevented in New England. The illustrative numbersfor tex-
tiles (which, it should be remembered, are based on the neutral but un-
substantiated assumption that the share of the south was independent of
the absolute sue of national employment) suggest that prevention, even if
feasible, of 10.2 thousand job layoffs in New England could have been
achieved only with 29.1 thousand additional jobs in the south. Thus,
three additional persons would have started employment in the south, in
an admittedly uneconomic use of scarce resources, to save one job in the
north.
These numbers are illustrative, and nothing more. The dynamics of
locational choice within industries are not well understood, and until
they are, it will be difficult to carry the argument further. It should—20—
benoted, however, that there was some (not necessarily highly effective)
protection accorded to the Pmerican textile industry (luring the 1970 1:0
1976period. Given the regional shift that in fact occurred, theobserved
changes in employment location obviously reflect, at least somewhat, the
degree to which joblossesin the north were avoided: given that the in—
dustry continued its relocation to the south, the decline in national
employment that was prevented went in considerable proportion to increased
employment opportunities in the south.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Despite the intuitive appeal of the notion that increased imports
must have been a significant determinant of the ttimpact: effecttt :i.n layoffs
and job losses in the United States, examination of the evidence doeS not
support the case to any substantial degree Not only do importsinto
the United States, even in the industries where they are believed to be
harming American workers, constitute relatively small fractionsof total
domestic consumption, but in addition, rates of changeofdemandand of
labor productivity growth have been quantitatively larger than changes in
the import share,
Moreover,there are important questions as to the extentthat pro-
tection, even ifit wereintensified, would prevent job layoffs. On one
hand, there issomeevidence that higher profitability may lead tomore
rapidinvestment, which inturn may result in a more rapid rateofchange
intechnique toward more capital—intensive methods.As such, it maybe
capital, and not labor, which gains more by protectionistmeasures. In—21—
addition, the fact that industries can relocate regionally in the United
States further diminishes whatever link there might be between import
levels and job layoffs in particular industries. At least some part of
whatever additional employmentmight resultfrom protection accrues to
regions andstateswhich are not experiencing job losses: an important:
question is the extent to which protection might in fact increase the
rate of industrial relocation.
Whilethereare hardships involved with any job termination and ne-
cessity to relocate either occupationally or geographically,, it is not
evident that those hardships are more intense when layoffs are "caused't
by one factor, such as import competition, than by any other (such as
regional relocation, a- declining industry, or a poorly managed firm)
For the United States, a strong case can be made that social policy to-
ward those losing jobs should be independent of whether the lostjobs
are attributable to imports or not. Not only is it conceptually difficult,,
if not impossible, to ascertain causation, but even if one could make
statementssuch as that fraction of job losses were "caused" by
import competition, while fraction (l—x1) were a consequence of other
factors, it seems implausible that a method for identifying which of
the newly unemployed should be treated differently.
Perhaps even more importantly, the available evidence for the United
States seems convincing that job turnovers have been nre a consequence
of the process of economic growth than they have been of imports. The
economic costs of "saving jobs lost due to imports", no matter how done,
would be very high per job saved. Not only theory, but the available
empirical evidence, supports the view that trade policy is not an appro-
priate instrument to deal with even the "impact effect" on employment.—22—
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